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ABSTRACT
Adversarial Machine learning is a field of reserarch lying at the intersection of Machine
Learning and Security, which studies vulnerabilities of Machine learning models that make
them susceptible to attacks. The attacks are inflicted by carefully designing a perturbed
input which appears benign, but fools the models to perform in unexpected ways. To date,
most work in adversarial attacks and defenses has been done for classification models. How-
ever, generative models are susceptible to attacks as well, and thus warrant attention. We
study some attacks for generative models like Autoencoders and Variational Autoencoders.
We discuss the relative effectiveness of the attack methods, and explore some simple defense
methods against the attacks.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Machine Learning is a field spanning fields of Computer Science and Statistics, which
studies algorithms enabling machines to learn different tasks by using extensive data. The
motivation behind the field, is to utilize the vast amount of data available to us to make the
machines perform these tasks at par, or sometimes even better than humans. A side-product
of this is that it also allows us to gain insight into the learning process used by human brains.
Today, it is one of the most relevant and powerful technologies, being deployed to every task
imaginable.
The earliest work in Machine Learning started around 1950s, when Turing proposed a
‘learning model’ that could learn and become artificially intelligent. Rosenblatt invented the
Perceptron in 1957, which formed the basis of the neural networks we use today. The famous
Backpropagation algorithm was introduced in 1980s, and paved the way for extensive re-
search in training powerful neural networks. Early 2000s saw the development of traditional
ML models like SVM and Nearest Neighbors, while Deep Learning became feasible around
2010, and is used almost everywhere now, for tasks ranging from distinguishing cats from
dogs, to beating the world’s best Chess and Go players.
We have progressed rapidly, to the current state where ML is being applied for solving
problems in different fields, like Computer Vision, Natural Language Processing, Neuro-
science, Biomedical Engineering, etc. It has proved to be a boon to many of these fields,
solving complex problems from scratch in a matter of a few hours, and providing insights
which were never possible before. However, as with any powerful technology, AI and ML
come with their own set of problems. The rampant development of ML algorithms with
superior performance and ease of deployment at scale, gave rise to a new field of malicious
algorithms, which aim to fool the carefully trained ML systems. This field came to be known
as Adversarial ML, as it exploits specific vulnerabilities of the learning algorithms to generate
adversarial examples which look harmless/legitimate to a human, but lead the trained ML
models to perform in unexpected ways. For example, a classifier trained to classify images as
cats or dogs can be fooled by providing it an adversarial image which looks like cat, but has
been carefully perturbed such that the classifier predicts it as dog. Such malfunctioning can
be detrimental in crucial tasks like image recognition by an autonomous car - an adversarial
STOP sign can be classified as a GO sign, and cause serious mishaps on the road. Due to
its severe implications, Adversarial ML became an important field and gained the attention
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of researchers in ML and Security. With the ease of attacking the models, there was need
to enhance the security of these models by protecting them against well known attacks, as
well as from attacks which were not yet known to everyone. This led to studying defense
methods for attacks on different ML models.
Almost all adversarial attacks and defenses developed till now are for Classification models.
There has been growing interest in studying adversarial attacks for generative models as well.
In the next chapter, we look at the difference between discriminative and generative models,
and review some common generative models.
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CHAPTER 2: GENERATIVE MODELS
2.1 DISCRIMINATIVE VS GENERATIVE MODELS
Discriminative models model the probability p(y|x), ie the probability of a label, given
the data. We assume a probability distribution, for eg. gaussian/binomial distribution, and
estimate the parameters which best fit the training set. Generative models learn the joint
probability distribution p(x, y), ie, the probability of the data, given a label. Thus, gener-
ative models can be used to obtain the label probability by Bayes conditional probability
rule p(y|x) = p(x, y)/p(x). Since they model the probability of data given label, they can
also be used to“generate” or synthesize new data by feeding a label/latent vector, through
the probability distribution p(x|y) = p(x, y)/p(y). Thus generative models have greater ex-
pressive power. However, discriminative models generally outperfrom generative models on
classification tasks. Most classifiers, like Logistic Regression, Neural Networks are discrim-
inative models, since they directly model p(y|x). Some examples of generative models are
Naive Bayes, Bayes Net, Denoising Autoencoser, VAE, GAN.
2.2 AUTOENCODER
Autoencoders (AE) are neural networks trained to reconstruct the input at the output
layer. This can be trivially done by learning an identity function if there are no constraints
on the number of hidden units, however in AEs, we restrict the number of hidden units in
the middle layers to be smaller than the input size, so that the network forms a compressed
representation of the input. This is called the latent representation, and the part of the
network upto the latent layer is called encoder. The latent vector is then passed through a
decoder which is the mirror image (in terms of architecture) of the encoder. The output layer
is thus the same size as the input layer, and the output obtained at this layer is compared to
the input to compute the loss to train the network. Due to the encoder-decoder architecture
of the network, autoencoders are often used to abstract compressed form representation
of data, which can be used for other downstream tasks. Autoencoders are not generative
models, strictly speaking, because they cant generate a meaningful output without the latent
vector obtained from the input. Variational Autoencoders, discussed next are a stochastic
version of autoencoder, which are generative.
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Figure 2.1: Autoencoder architecture
(source: www.jeremyjordan.me/autoencoders/)
2.3 VARIATIONAL AUTOENCODER
Variational Autoencoders (VAE) are quite similar to autoencoders in their architecture
and purpose, however they have better generalizability and generative power which was
non-existent in traditional autoencoders. This is obtained by adding a constraint on the
encoding network, that forces it to generate latent vectors that roughly follow a unit gaussian
distribution. Instead of producing a real-value latent vector which is passed directly to the
decoder, VAEs produce a mean vector and a standard deviation vector, which is sampled to
obtain the latent vector. This latent vector is then passed through the decoder to obtain the
reconstruction of the input. The unit gaussian constraint is required so that we can generate
images without any input image - we can randomly sample a vector from a unit gaussian
and use it as the latent vector for the decoder. This allows us to generate images out of
thin air, unlike autoencoders, which needed to compress an input image to reconstruct an
image. There is a trade-off between how closely the latent vector can match a unit gaussian,
and how accurate the reconstructions are. This trade-off is left for the network to decide, by
training it on a loss function comprising of both the terms - the reconstruction loss, and the
KL divergence between the latent layer and unit gaussian distribution. (Eq. 2.1-2.3) While
VAEs have proven to be powerful, their reconstructions are somewhat blurry, because of the
L2 loss used in the reconstruction loss. VAE-GANs use GANs to compute the reconstruction
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Figure 2.2: VAE architecture
(source: https://www.jeremyjordan.me/variational-autoencoders/)
loss instead, and thus tend to produce better images, as discussed in the next section.
li(θ, φ) = −Ez∼qθ(z|xi)(logpφ(xi|z)) +DKL(q(z|x)||p(z)) (2.1)
= lpixeli,llike + li,prior
lpixeli,llike = −Ez∼qθ(z|xi)(logpφ(xi|z)) (2.2)
li,prior = DKL(q(z|x)||p(z)) (2.3)
L =
N∑
i=1
(li)
2.4 GENERATIVE ADVERSARIAL NETWORK (GAN)
Generative Adversarial Networks, popularly referred to as GANs were first introduced
in 2014 by Ian Goodfellow and other researchers at the University of Montreal, including
Turing award winner Yoshua Bengio [1]. They were received with great enthusiasm in the
ML community due to the elegance of the idea of adversarial training, and their power to
learn to mimic any distribution of data in any domain : images, music, speech, text. They
comprise of two deep networks, involved in a game against each other. One network, called
the Generator tries to generate new data samples, while the other network, called discrimi-
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nator tries to tell them apart from real world samples, ie, it tries to judge the authenticity
of the examples given to it. Thus, the game being played is the generator generating realis-
tic examples which fool the discriminator into believing they are real world examples, and
the discriminator trying to maintain a high accuracy of discriminating between generator-
synthesized and real-world examples. It can be considered analogous to the game between a
counterfeiter and an officer responsible for flagging fake currencies. It is important to note
that the game is dynamic, as both the parties are learning on the go with each new example,
and they also learn the other party’s methods continuously to improve their own game.
The architecture of a GAN is shown in Fig. 2.3 The discriminator is a simple binary
classifier, which takes in an input (generally an image), and predicts the probability of it
being fake or real. The generator is similar to the decoder in VAEs, as it takes in a vector,
and generates an image from it. In this case, the input vector is a random noise vector. It is
generally implemented as an inverse convolutional network. The generator and discriminator
try to minimize different loss functions, which are opposing each other (in game-theoretic
terminology, they are playing a zero-sum game). The objective function for the discriminator
comprises of two terms - the first term is the expectation of correctly predicting a real
image as real, and the second term is the expectation of correctly predicting a generator-
synthesized image as fake. Thus the discriminator tries to maximize this objective. The
generator, on the other hand tries to minimize the loss function in eq.2.4, ie, it wants to
minimize the expectation of the discriminator correctly predicting its generated samples
as fake. The network is trained by training the discriminator and generator alternatively,
through backpropagation. The parameters of one network are fixed while training the other
network.
LGAN = V (G,D) = Ex∼pdata(x)[logD(x)] + Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z)))] (2.4)
min
G
max
D
V (G,D) (2.5)
2.5 VAE-GAN
VAEs produce unrealistic and blurry images due to the way they calculate the reconstruc-
tion loss. Element-wise L2 loss between the pixels of the recontructed and original images
is used. Larsen et. al [2] showed that we can obtain sharper and visually more convincing
images by combining VAE and GAN, ie, by replacing the element-wise loss with feature loss
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Figure 2.3: GAN architecture
(source: skymind.ai)
computed by the decoder of a GAN. The model shares the VAE decoder with the GAN
generator, ie, they are both the same unit. The discriminator of GAN computes the re-
construction loss between the output of the decoder and the original input. We also add
the GAN loss, to enable the network to preserve the style of the inputs. The discriminator
reconstruction loss can be seen as the content loss.
L = Lprior + LDislllike + LGAN (2.6)
LDislllike = Eq(z|x)(z|x)[log(p(Disl(x|z)))]
and Lprior, LGAN are given by Eq.1.3 and Eq. 1.5, respectively
Figure 2.4: VAE-GAN architecture
(source: Larsen at.al [2])
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CHAPTER 3: ATTACKS AND DEFENSES FOR CLASSIFICATION
MODELS
The purpose of an attacker is to fool a carefully trained model (in this case a classifier),
either at the train or test time, such that it either learns a poor decision boundary, or mis-
classifies examples at test time. By fooling a classifier, we mean that the input samples are
such that they are practically impossible to differentiate from legitimate examples, but when
passed to the classifier, they are mis-classified into an incorrect class. The synthesized ad-
versarial samples need to be imperceptibly different from the legitimate examples, because
otherwise a human can easily filter out the adversarial examples from the test set. This
means that the noise added to the original sample should have a small enough magnitude
to be imperceptible, while also leading to a mis-classification.
Figure 3.1: An example of adversarial attack which causes a classifier to mis-classify an adversarial
image of panda as gibbon (Image courtesy: Goodfellow et.al [3]
3.1 TYPE OF ATTACKS ON CLASSIFIERS
Attacks developed so far can be categorized based on different criteria:
1. Based on the sample set they can modify:
• Evasion Attack - the adversary perturbs the test samples, to make the trained
model misclassify them. The adversary does not perturb the training samples in
this case.
• Poisoning attack - the adversary perturbs/contaminates some of the training
samples, thus affecting the model trained on this set.
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2. Based on the purpose of the attack:
• Untargeted attack - the adversary is simply interested in contaminating the
sample just enough to make the model misclassify it into any class other than the
correct class the original sample belonged to.
• Targeted attack - the adversary aims to perturb the sample such that the model
classifies it to a particular target class, rather than any incorrect class. Targeted
attack is thus harder than untargeted attack.
3. Based on the level of access the adversary has:
• White box attack - Adversary has all information about the architecture of the
classification model and the training procedure and parameters used. It also has
access to the training dataset. Most white box attack methods exploit the gradient
of the loss function wrt the input, to identify optimal direction of perturbation.
• Black box attack - adversary has limited access to the model. Mostly, it does not
know the model architecture and training procedure. The training set may/may
not be available. On the face of it, black box models might give a sense of security
due to restricting the access to the attacker. However, Papernot et.al [4] showed
that it is rather easy to attack black box models as well. The general approach to
circumvent the restricted information about the model, is to train a local model
on either the training set if it is available, or querying the black box model on a
set of samples. After training the local model, white box attack methods are used
to generate adversarial examples for it, which are then transferred to the black
box model.
3.2 PROBLEM FORMULATION FOR ATTACK
The problem of generating an untargeted adversarial example for a classifier F , for the
original sample X can be formulated as follows:
X∗ = X + arg min
δX
(‖δX‖ : F (X + δX) 6= F (X)) (3.1)
For targeted attack, with yt as the target class:
X∗ = X + arg min
δX
(‖δX‖ : F (X + δX) = yt) (3.2)
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Attack algorithms use modifications of this formulation and different optimization methods
to generate adversarial examples. Some of the well known white-box attack methods for Deep
Neural Networks are L-BFGS, FGSM, Projected Gradient Descent, JSMA, and Deepfool.
We will briefly discuss the first two of them, since we will use them in our work on generative
models.
3.3 REVIEW OF POPULAR ATTACK METHODS
• L-BFGS: Szegedy et.al [5] showed in their paper“Intriguing properties of neural net-
works”, published in 2014, that neural networks are susceptible to adversarial exam-
ples, and this was contradictory to the notion that neural networks have high gen-
eralization power. They found that these networks learn fairly discontinuous input-
outptut mappings. Thus they could generate adversarial examples by applying hardly
perceptible perturbation to the image, such that it maximizes the prediction error.
Furthermore, the adversarial examples generated for one network were also successful
in fooling another network trained on a different subset of training set (transferability),
and with different hyperparameters. They used box-constrained L-BFGS to solve the
optimization problem given by Eq.3.1. The adversarial example X∗ is obtained by
adding noise r such that X+r is still in the input space D. They were able to generate
adversarial examples for linear softmax classifiers with no hidden layers and sigmoidal
neural networks with 2 hidden layers and a classifier, trained on MNIST dataset. They
were also able to generate adversarial examples for AlexNet.
X∗ = X + arg min
r
F (X + r) = l s.t. (X + r) ∈ D (3.3)
• FGSM: Goodfellow et.al [3] debunked the then-held belief that neural networks were
susceptible to adversarial attacks due to their nonlinearity and overfitting, and showed
that it is indeed the opposite - they are susceptible due to their linearity. They also
proposed a fast method to generate adversarial examples which can be used for adver-
sarial training to make the models robust to attacks. The method, called fast gradient
sign method linearizes the cost function and calculates its gradient with respect to the
input. The adversarial example is then generated according to Eq. 3.4. They were also
able to generate adversarial examples by simply rotating the images in the direction
of the gradient. An adversarial objective function based on FGSM was used to train
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the models, to increase the robustness to adversarial examples.
X∗ = X + sign(∇xJ(X, ytrue)) (3.4)
3.4 PROBLEM FORMULATION FOR DEFENSE
The job of the defender is to make the model robust to adversarial attacks. Since the
defender does not have any control over the inputs faced by the model, the defense is either
reactive - developing methods for identifying adversarial examples and rejecting them, or
proactive - making the model robust to adversarial examples by giving the correct predic-
tions for the adversarial examples as well: Fˆ (X∗) = Fˆ (X) = F (X), where X∗ is adversarial
example generated by an attack method following the model in Eq. 3.1(targeted) or 3.2(un-
targeted), Fˆ is the defense model, F is the original model.
3.5 PROPERTIES OF GOOD DEFENSE METHODS
A good defense method should hold certain properties. It should maintain the same
performance on the clean dataset, as the original model. It should be computationally
efficient, ie, it should not increase the test run time significantly. It should also be memory
efficient, ie, it does not require significantly more memory to perform the task, than the
original unguarded model.
3.6 REVIEW OF POPULAR DEFENSE METHODS
As discussed above, the defense methods can be divided into two categories : reactive
or proactive. Among the reactive defenses, adversarial detection and input pre-processing
are the common techniques. Among proactive defenses, Adversarial Training and Network
Distillation are effective techniques.
• Adversarial Detection Instead of attempting to provide the correct prediction for an
adversarial example, a defender can attempt to solve an easier problem - distinguishing
the adversarial examples from benign ones. SafetyNet [6] uses an auxiliary detection
network to classify inputs as adversarial/benign. PixelCNN [7] used the difference in
the distribution of adversarial and clean examples for detection.
• Input Pre-processing If input adversarial image can somehow be“cleaned” back
to the original image, then the model can easily give the correct prediction for the
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processed image. Denoising autoencoders and PixelCNN have been effective for this
purpose. Cruder pre-processing steps, like binary thresholding or mean filtering can
also be used to reduce the effect of the noise added to the adversarial image.
• Adversarial Training A new model with the same architecture as the original model,
is trained on the original clean samples along with some adversarial samples generated
during training time. It can be viewed as a way to regularize the model, by pro-
viding it noisy perturbed samples. It has been shown to be effective against single
step attack methods like FGSM, but not against optimization based attacks. Further,
adversarially trained models are robust against attacks generated for the model it-
self, but cannot defend against transferred adversarial examples (adversarial examples
generated against a normal model).
• Defensive Distillation Papernot et.al [4] suggested the use of distillation for training
a DNN classifier to make it robust to adversarial examples. Distillation was a technique
which was applied earlier for training smaller networks using knowledge from larger
networks, to achieve improvement in computational efficiency. However, Papernot et.
al proposed a way to use distillation to extract knowledge after training a network and
feeding it back to the same network, to make it resilient to adversarial perturbations.
First, the DNN is trained in the regular way, on the training set consisting of images and
hard class labels. The class probability vectors of this trained network are then used
as soft class labels for training the same network again - the network is trained on the
original images, but the original hard class labels are replaced by soft class labels (class
probability vector for the given image, from the previous training of the network). They
showed that this method produced smoother classifiers by reducing their sensitivity to
input perturbations. The success rate of adversarial attacks decreased from 95.89% to
0.45% on the MNIST dataset and from 87.89% to 5.11% on the CIFAR10 dataset.
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CHAPTER 4: ATTACKING GENERATIVE MODELS
4.1 OVERVIEW
We implement three types of attacks for Autoencoder and VAE models. Some of the
attack methods have been discussed in earlier work by Kos et.al [8] and Tobacof et.al [9]. The
attacks, evaluated on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets are implemented with the cleverhans
Python library.
4.2 MOTIVATION
Kos et.al [8] discuss a scenario in which an attacker might be motivated to attack a
generative model. A sender compresses an image using an encoder (for example encoder
of an Autoencoder/VAE/VAE-GAN) and sends the compressed latent representation to a
receiver who is space and/or time separated. The receiver decodes the latent vector by
passing it through a decoder. Consider the case of a bank customer sending an image of a
cheque to the bank. A bank representative from the sender’s branch encodes the image and
sends it to a representative in the head branch, who then decodes it with his decoder. If
the customer has malicious intent, they may try to corrupt the image such that the bank
representative encoding the image does not suspect the authenticity of the image, yet, when
the encoded latent vector for the image is decoded by the second representative, it produces
a different image than the input image - for example, if the input cheque image read 100$,
and the decoded image read 900$. Fig. 4.1 depicts the scenario. There can be some other
high risk scenarios which use the same idea of space-separated encoder and decoder to fool
carefully designed generative models.
Figure 4.1: Depiction of attack scenario (by Kos et.al [8])
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Figure 4.2: Sample images from MNIST and CIFAR-10
4.3 ATTACK MODEL
Given an autoencoder model M, training set Str = {X tri , ytri } and test set
Stest = {X testi , ytesti }, the aim of an attacker is to pick a source image X and target image
Xtar, and perturb X by adding some noise to obtain X
∗ such that the distance of X∗ to
Xtar is minimized, subject to the constraint that X
∗ still lies in the valid image space. X
and Xtar are typically selected from the test set.
X∗ = X + arg min
δX
{dist(M(X + δX), Xtar)}
st X∗ ∈ [0, 1] (4.1)
Note that M(X) = d(z(X)) where d is the decoder and z is the encoder. The distance
between X∗ and Xtar can be represented by different metrics, like L1, L2, L 8 norms of
(X∗ −Xtar), or cross entropy distance between X∗ and Xtar
4.4 DATASETS
We implement attacks on two datsets:
• MNIST - It consists of 50,000 training examples and 10,000 test examples of 28 × 28
black and white handwritten digits.
• CIFAR-10 [10] - It consists of 50,000 training images and 10,000 test images. The
images are RGB of size 32×32 and belong to one of the following 10 classes : airplane,
automobile, bird, cat, deer, dog, frog, horse, ship, truck
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4.5 EVALUATION METRICS
An attack is successful if the reconstructed image looks like the target image instead of the
original image. Visual similarity is hard to capture numerically, but we use the L2 distance
between the reconstruction and the original image (d1) and that between the reconstruction
and the target image (d2) to capture this. Thus, for a good attack, we should get d1 < d2.
A good attack should also not add too much noise to the original image to obtain the
adversarial image, lest it becomes visually recognizable. Another indirect way to measure
the success of an attack is through the label prediction for the reconstructions. A classifier is
trained on the clean training set, and then used to predict the labels of the reconstructions of
the adversarial images. If the prediction is the target label, the attack can be considered to
be effective, and if it is the original label, the attack was unsuccessful. Also, if the prediction
was neither the target nor the true label, the attack is still a successful untargeted attack.
4.6 UNDERSTANDING THE FIGURES IN RESULTS
Referring to the results for all attacks except L-BFGS: for adversarial images, column i
corresponds to the source image belonging to class i, and row j corresponds to the target
image belonging to class j. So the image at location (i, j) is the adversarial image obtained
for a source image from class i, and a target image from class j. The images lying on the
diagonal are thus clean images (no adversarial perturbation), because the source and target
images are the same for them. The reconstruction figure shows the reconstructions of the
corresponding adversarial inputs. For a perfect attack, each column should display images
from 0-9 (for MNIST dataset). The diagonal is again insignificant, as it is the reconstruction
of clean unperturbed images.
4.7 L-BFGS ATTACK
The L-BFGS attack was built upon the code by Tobacof et.al [9]. They attack the latent
layer of the autoencoder, such that the latent representation for adversarial image is close
to that of target image, while ensuring that the noise added image is within the minimum
and maximum pixel value bounds.
• Loss Function: An autoencoder is first trained on the training set using the usual
squared error between the original image and reconstruction.
• L-BFGS attack : L-BFGS attack is used to synthesize adversarial images for the trained
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model. The attack consists of a regularization parameter C, which controls the trade-
off between minimization of noise, and closeness of latent representation of adversarial
image to that of target image. The best value of C is found by performing a line
search for the maximum value of C which gives adv dist ≤ orig dist, over a reason-
able range of values (where orig dist = dist(original image, reconstruction
of adversarial image), adv dist = dist(original image,
reconstruction of adversarial image), and dist(a,b) is the squared error be-
tween a and b). The noise corresponding to this value of C is added to the original
image to get the adversarial image.
min
d
4(za, zt) + C‖d‖
s.t. L ≤ x+ d ≤ U
where za = enocder(xt)
zt = enocder(x+ d)
where the original image is x and the adversarial image is x∗ = x + d. 4 is some
distance metric, like L2 distance, and L and U are the lower and upper bounds on the
image space pixel values.
• Observations: The attack is very slow, since it searches for the optimal value of C
by line search in every iteration. The adversarial images produced were visibly noisy,
however the reconstructions, as shown in Fig 4.3, were quite close to the target images.
Adversarial training did not provide any visible improvement in the reconstructions,
and surprisingly, was easier to attack than the original model (it had lower attack time,
and lower magnitude of noise added).
4.7.1 Implementation Details
This attack was only implemented on MNIST dataset. Due to its very high run time, we
did not implement it for CIFAR-10 dataset.
• Autoencoder model :
The encoder consists of 3 Fully Connected (FC) layers, the first two containing 500 neu-
rons each, and the third layer, which gives the latent representation contains 100 neu-
rons. The decoder is exact mirror image of encoder, containing two FC layers with 500
neurons each, and the output layer containing img ht× img breadthhnumberofunits.
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• Parameter Settings :
A batch size of 128 and 10 epochs were used for training the Autoencoder. The line search
for the best value of C was done over 100 values in the logspace starting from -20 to 20. For
adversarial training, 1000 adversarial images were added to the training set.
4.8 FGSM ATTACK
We used the open source python cleverhans library [11] for building FGSM attacks for
autoencoders. The library has several attack methods and adversarial training for classifi-
cation CNNs. We extended it for our study, by including models for autoencoder and VAE,
the appropriate loss functions, attack success metrics, and the FGSM attack for the purpose
at hand.
• Loss Function: The original autoencoder model was trained to minimize the squared
error between the original image and its reconstruction. (For the original model, the
original image is the same as the image fed to the encoder, while for the adversarially
trained model, for the adversarial examples, the original image is different from the
image fed to the encoder)
Jθ(x, rec(x)) =
∑
i,j
(xij − rec(x)ij))2 (4.2)
where rec(x) = dec(enc(x))
• FGSM Attack: The attack uses the negative gradient of the loss wrt the target class
probability, to find the perturbation to be added to the original image.
For an untargeted attack, the following equations give the adversarial image x′:
η = sign(∇xJθ(x, rec(x))
x′ = x+ η (4.3)
For our study, we studied targeted attacks, thus we modified the attack as:
η = sign(∇xJθ(xt, rec(x)))
x′ = x− η (4.4)
where xt is the target image we want the reconstruction of the adversarial image to
be close to. The difference is that for targeted attack, we take the gradient of the loss
17
L-BFGS attack on MNIST Autoencoder
L-BFGS attack on MNIST VAE
Figure 4.3: Examples of L-BFGS attack; Every enclosed square is one example : top left - original
image, top right - reconstruction of original image, middle left - noise added to adversarial image,
middle right - target image, bottom left - adversarial image, bottom right - reconstruction of
adversarial image
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function with the target image and reconstruction of original image as inputs, and add
negative of that gradient to the original image.
• Adversarial Training: Adversarial training uses some clean and some adversarial ex-
amples for training the new model. The proportion of clean and adversarial can be
controlled by the adversarial coefficient α
Jθ(x, xt) = αJθ(x, rec(x)) + (1− α)Jθ(x, rec(x′)) (4.5)
4.8.1 Implementation Details
MNIST
• Autoencoder model : The encoder consists of 3 Fully Connected (FC) layers, the
first two containing 500 neurons each, and the third layer, which gives the latent
representation contains 100 neurons. The decoder is exact mirror image of encoder,
containing two FC layers with 500 neurons each, and the output layer containing
img ht × img breadth number of units.
• Parameter Settings: A batch size of 128 and 8 epochs were used for training the
Autoencoder. For FGSM attack,  = 0.3. For adversarial training, the adversarial
coefficent α had value 0.5.
CIFAR-10
• Autoencoder Model: It is comprised of 7 convolutional layers, each followed by Batch
Normalization, Relu activation (except the last layer, which has sigmoid activation),
and MaxPooling/Upsampling for the encoder/decoder. The reconstruction error after
100 epochs is 18.
• VAE Model: Convolutional VAE with 3 convolutional layers for the encoder and de-
coder each. RELU acitvation is used in each of these layers, while the output layer
uses sigmoid activation. The reconstruction error after 100 epochs is 41.
• Classifier Model: It is composed of 4 convolutional layers and a dense output layer.
Dropouts are used between the layers for regularization. The accuracy on test set after
100 epochs is 72.5%
19
• Parameter Settings: A batch size of 128 and 8 epochs were used for training the
Autoencoder. For FGSM attack,  = 0.3. For adversarial training, the adversarial
coefficent α had value 0.5.
4.8.2 Results
MNIST
Fig. 4.4 shows that the reconstructions of the adversarial images are either unrecognizable
or close to the original images. The noise added to the inputs is perceivable in some examples,
but looks like white noise in most cases. The prediction of the target class was 11% and
that of the true class was 47.8%. Fig. 4.5 shows that for VAE, the reconstructions of
the adversarial images are perturbed to the target images in just a handful of cases. The
noise added to the adversarial images is noticeable, but looks like random white noise. The
prediction of the target class was 12.2% and that of the true class was 23.3%. Thus, the
attack is more successful against VAEs than Autoencoders. The noise added (3.79) is also
less than that added for the autoencoder (5.47)
CIFAR-10
Fig. 4.6 shows that the adversarial inputs for autoecoder are extremely noisy, and can
easily be identified as adversarial. The reconstructions are almost unidentifiable. The clas-
sifier prediction of target class is 21.1% and that of true class is 6.8%. The noise added
is 15.78. From the figures and the metrics, we can conclude that FGSM is not successful
against Autoencoder. Similarly, in Fig. 4.7 the adversarial inputs for the VAE are easily
identifiable as adversarial. The reconstructions are predicted as belonging to target class
15.5% and to true class 8.9% of the times. The average distance between the reconstruction
and the target images (d2) is much lower than the distance between the reconstruction and
the original image (d1).
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Figure 4.4: FGSM Attack on MNIST Autoencoder
Figure 4.5: FGSM Attack on MNIST VAE
21
Figure 4.6: FGSM Attack on CIFAR-10, Autoencoder Model: Adversarial Images(top) and their
reconstructions(bottom)
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Figure 4.7: FGSM Attack on CIFAR-10, VAE Model: Adversarial Images(top) and their recon-
structions(bottom)
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4.9 CARLINI-WAGNER ITERATIVE L2 ATTACK
This attack is an optimization attack. It minimizes the cost function given by eq. 4.6. The
constant λ controls the relative importance given to the reconstruction error and the noise
added. Increasing λ should increase the amount of noise added to obtain the adversarial
image, in order to obtain a reconstruction closer to the target images, while decreasing it
should have the opposite effect. The optimal value of λ is found by performing binary
search. We start with an initial value of λ, and update it according to the following rule:
if the attack was successful with the current value of lambda, we reduce the search space
to [lower bound, λcurr], while if it was unsuccessful, we search in [λcurr, upper bound]. The
success of an attack is judged by the prediction of a classifier on the reconstruction of the
adversarial image. If the classifier predicts the label as the target label, the attack is said to
be successful, and unsuccessful otherwise.
l1 = ‖rec(x∗)− xtarg‖
l2 = ‖x∗ − x‖
l = λl1 + l2 (4.6)
A variant of the attack can be obtained by attacking the latent layer instead of the final
reconstruction layer. Eq.4.7 shows the cost function for this attack. The optimal value
of λ is found in the same manner as discussed above, except that the success of attack is
determined by comparing the label of prediction of z(x∗) by a classifier trained on the latent
layer.
l1 = ‖z(x∗)− z(xtarg)‖
l2 = ‖x∗ − x‖
l = λl1 + l2 (4.7)
4.9.1 Implementation Details
MNIST
• Autoencoder model : The same as in section 3.5
• Parameter Settings: A batch size of 90 and 8 epochs were used for training the Au-
toencoder. For Carlini Wagner attack, num iterations varies from 1000 to 10000.
binary search steps varies from 5 to 10.
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CIFAR-10
• Autoencoder model: The same as in section 3.5
• VAE model : The same as in section 3.5
• Parameter settings: A batch size of 90 and 100 epochs was used for training the
Autoencoder. The classifier was trained for 80 epochs, with RMSProp optimizer. The
number of binary search steps was fixed at 1 (which means no binary search was
performed and the initial constant was used throughout)
4.9.2 Results
MNIST
Figure 4.8 shows results for selected values of the parameters num iterations and
binary search steps. The figures suggest that the attack is successful, as the reconstruc-
tions resemble the target images in most cases. Some source classes (like 2,7) are easier to
perturb than others (like 1,3,9), and some target classes (like 1,5,8,9) are easier to perturb
to. The classifier prediction on the reconstructed images belonged to the target class for all
source and target classes, giving a 100% target class accuracy. The noise added was 3.94,
and the average distance between the reconstructions and original images was almost equal
to the average distance between the reconstructions and target images (d1 ≈ d2). The VAE
model (Fig. 4.9) was harder to attack, and the predictions belonged to target and source
class 27.7% of the times each.
CIFAR-10
Fig. 4.10 shows the results of CW attack on Autoencoder model. Most of the reconstruc-
tions still resemble the original images . The noise added to the images is perceivable for
some of the examples, but for most of them it is low. Table 4.2 shows that the classifier
prediction for the target class is 31.1% and that for the true class is 25%. The average noise
added is 5.29, and the distance of the reconstruction from the target images is significantly
higher than the original images. Thus, the attack is not very effective against Autoencoder.
For VAE, the reconstructions are blurry, but the attack was successful in causing most of the
reconstructions to resemble the target images. The noise added to the adversarial images is
imperceptible in most cases. Table 4.2 shows that the classifier prediction for target class
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is 70%, compared to 7.8% for the true class. The distance between the reconstruction and
target image is lower than that between the reconstruction and original image (d2 < d1).
Thus the attack is successful against VAE.
DATASET MODEL ATTACK METRIC
d1 47.69
d2 59.61
noise 5.47
AE FGSM class acc clean 0.97
class acc adv target 0.11
class acc adv true 0.478
d1 41.19
d2 40.37
noise 3.94
CW class acc clean 0.97
class acc adv target 1.0
class acc adv true 0.0
MNIST d1 61.56
d2 80.97
noise 3.79
VAE FGSM class acc clean 0.97
class acc adv target 0.122
class acc adv true 0.233
d1 54.73
d2 46.27
noise 3.93
CW class acc clean 0.97
class acc adv target 0.267
class acc adv true 0.267
Table 4.1: Results of Adversarial attacks on MNIST dataset
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Iter = 1000, Binary Search steps = 5
Iter = 1000, Binary Search steps = 10
Iter = 10000, Binary Search steps = 5
Figure 4.8: CW Attack on MNIST Autoencoder for different values of iterations and binary search
steps
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Figure 4.9: CW Attack for MNIST VAE and their reconstructions for Iter = 10000, Binary Search
steps = 5
DATASET MODEL ATTACK METRIC
d1 149.60
d2 144.25
noise 15.78
AE FGSM class acc clean 0.72
class acc adv target 0.211
class acc adv true 0.068
d1 54.97
d2 261.85
noise 5.29
CW class acc clean 0.72
class acc adv target 0.311
CIFAR-10 class acc adv true 0.25
d1 575.38
d2 235.33
noise 15.48
VAE FGSM class acc clean 0.72
class acc adv target 0.155
class acc adv true 0.089
d1 250
d2 147
noise 7.87
CW class acc clean 0.72
class acc adv target 0.7
class acc adv true 0.078
Table 4.2: Results of Adversarial attacks on CIFAR-10 dataset
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Figure 4.10: CW Attack on CIFAR-10, Autoencoder Model: Adversarial Images (top) and their
reconstructions (bottom)
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Figure 4.11: CW Attack on CIFAR-10, VAE Model: Adversarial Images(top) and their reconstruc-
tions(bottom)
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CHAPTER 5: DEFENSES FOR GENERATIVE MODELS
5.1 OVERVIEW
We tried three defense methods for the attacks discussed in the previous chapter - Ad-
versarial Training, Binarization, and Mean Filtering. The latter two are simple image pre-
processing techniques, and as we will see, they are also the most effective defenses.
5.2 ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
Adversarial training refers to the training of a new model, similar in architecture as the
original model, but on a training set comprised of the clean examples from the original
training set and adversarial examples generated by the attack on the original model. By
teaching the model to predict the desired true label (for a classification model), or reconstruct
the true source image (for our case of generative model), we hope that the model will become
robust to adversarial examples, and thus perform better against new adversarial examples
generated for it. In case of classification models, adversarial training has been shown to be
effective against single step attacks like FGSM, but not so effective against iterative attacks.
We observe a similar result for our attacks on generative models- it proves to be effective
only against the FGSM attack, and ineffective against L-BFGS and iterative CW attacks.
5.2.1 Results
MNIST
Against FGSM attack on Autoencoder, it reduces the prediction of target label from 11%
to 5.56%, and increases the accuracy of the true label from 47.8% to 78.5%. The new model
was trained using the modified cost function given in Equation 4.5, with the adversarial
coefficient α = 0.5.
For CW attack on Autoencoder, adversarial training does not affect the target and true
label predictions at all. It does, however, provide marginal improvement in d1 and d2, from
41.19 to 39.9 and 40.37 to 36.13. Thus, it seems that adversarial training provided some
regularization, at best.
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CIFAR-10
It increases the prediction of the target label from 31.1% to 34.4% and decreases prediction
of true label from 25% to 20% for CW attack on Autoencoder. Thus, ironically, adversarial
training makes the model even more susceptible to attacks in this case. On VAE, however, it
decreased target label prediction from 70% to 55% and increased true label prediction from
7.8% to 26.7%
5.3 BINARIZATION (BINARY THRESHOLDING)
The adversarial images are produced by adding some noise to the original images. Visu-
alluy, it seems that the noise looks faint enough to be effectively removed by binarization.
Thus, we expect that preprocessing the input images by binarization before passing them to
the Autoencoder would be a good way to reproduce the original images. Fig. 5.1-5.4 show
the adversarial images after binarization, and their reconstructions.
5.3.1 Results
MNIST
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the metrics after Binarization for MNIST. It decreases the target
prediction to about 1% and increases the true label prediction to about 90% for all the cases,
except CW attack on VAE model, where it raises the prediction to 63%. Visually also, it is
a strong defense against both attacks for both the models.
CIFAR-10
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show that binarization increases the true class prediction to about 14%
for attacks against autoencoder and 4.4%, 18.9% for FGSM and CW attacks respectively
against VAEs. It is not a good defense for CIFAR-10, since the images are natural RGB
images, and binarization degrades the quality of the input images greatly, naturally making
the reconstructions poorer.
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5.4 MEAN FILTERING
Similar to binarization, mean filtering is expected to be another good approach of reducing
the effect of noise from the adversarial images. Fig.5.1-5.4 show the adversarial images after
mean filtering, and their reconstructions. The radius of the filter used is 2.
5.4.1 Results
MNIST
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the metrics after Mean filtering for MNIST. It decreases the
target prediction to about 1% and increases the true label prediction to about 94% for
attacks against Autoencoder. For VAE, it increases true label prediction to 77%, 57.8% for
FGSM and CW attacks, respectively. Visually, it is a strong defense like binarization.
CIFAR-10
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 summarize the result of mean filtering. The target label prediction drops
to about 10%. The true label prediction varies from 17.8% to 38.9% for different attacks and
models. It performs better than binarization for both the attacks and models for CIFAR-10.
Fig. 5.8 and 5.10 show that the reconstructions for the mean filtered adversarial images
generated by CW attack closely resemble the source images. However, for FGSM attack on
Autoencoder Fig 5.5 shows that the reconstructions of the mean filtered adversarial images
are still noisy. For FGSM attack on VAE (Fig 5.6), the reconstructions are too blurry, but
they resemble the source images.
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Adversarial Training
Binarization of Adversarial Examples
Mean-filtering of Adversarial Examples
Figure 5.1: Defenses for FGSM on Autoencoder: Adversarial Training, Binarization, Mean-
Filtering
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Binarization of Adversarial Examples
Mean-filtering of Adversarial Examples
Figure 5.2: Defenses for FGSM on VAE: Adversarial Training, Binarization, Mean-Filtering
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Adversarial Training
Binarization of Adversarial Examples
Mean-filtering of Adversarial Examples
Figure 5.3: Defenses for CW on Autoencoder: Adversarial Training, Binarization, Mean-Filtering
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Binarization of Adversarial Examples
Mean-filtering of Adversarial Examples
Figure 5.4: Defenses for CW on VAE: Binarization, Mean-Filtering
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Figure 5.5: Mean filtering Defense for FGSM attack on CIFAR-10, Autoencoder Model: Mean
filtered adversarial Inputs (top) and their reconstructions(bottom)
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Figure 5.6: Mean filtering Defense for FGSM attack on CIFAR-10, VAE Model: Mean filtered
adversarial Inputs (top) and their reconstructions(bottom)
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Figure 5.7: Adversarial Training Defense for CW attacks on CIFAR-10, Autoencoder Model: Ad-
versarial Inputs (top) and their reconstructions(bottom)
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Figure 5.8: Mean Filtering Defense for CW attacks on CIFAR-10, Autoencoder Model: Mean
filtered adversarial inputs (top) and their reconstructions(bottom)
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Figure 5.9: Adversarial Training Defense for CW attacks on CIFAR-10, VAE Model: Adversarial
inputs (top) and their reconstructions(bottom)
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Figure 5.10: Mean Filtering Defense for CW attacks on CIFAR-10, VAE Model: Mean filtered
adversarial inputs (top) and their reconstructions(bottom)
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ATTACK DEFENSE METRIC
d1 3.98
d2 10.14
Adversarial Training noise 2.98
class acc clean 0.97
class acc adv target 0.056
class acc adv true 0.785
d1 13.17
d2 88.09
Binarization noise 4.53
FGSM class acc clean 0.97
class acc adv target 0.011
class acc adv true 0.922
d1 24.39
d2 93.96
Mean Filtering noise 4.53
class acc clean 0.97
class acc adv target 0.01
class acc adv true 0.944
d1 39.9
d2 36.13
Adversarial Training noise 3.71
class acc clean 0.97
class acc adv target 1.0
class acc adv true 0.0
d1 16.62
d2 85.96
Binarization noise 4.28
CW class acc clean 0.91
class acc adv target 0.01
class acc adv true 0.91
d1 23.78
d2 95.24
Mean Filtering noise 4.56
class acc clean 0.97
class acc adv traget 0.01
class acc adv tru 0.94
Table 5.1: Results for MNIST, Autoencoder
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ATTACK DEFENSE METRIC
d1 19.13
d2 87.37
Binarization noise 3.79
FGSM class acc clean 0.97
class acc adv target 0.011
class acc adv true 0.855
d1 30.32
d2 91.20
Mean Filtering noise 4.53
class acc clean 0.97
class acc adv target 0.033
class acc adv true 0.77
d1 34.76
d2 71.63
Binarization noise 4.79
CW class acc clean 0.97
class acc adv target 0.1
class acc adv true 0.633
d1 36.11
d2 90.36
Mean Filtering noise 4.71
class acc clean 0.97
class acc adv traget 0.022
class acc adv tru 0.578
Table 5.2: Results for MNIST, VAE
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ATTACK DEFENSE METRIC
d1 295.65
d2 280.26
Binarization noise 26.09
FGSM class acc clean 0.72
class acc adv target 0.122
class acc adv true 0.133
d1 204.86
d2 275.37
Mean Filtering noise 15.89
class acc clean 0.72
class acc adv target 0.11
class acc adv true 0.178
d1 57.78
d2 257.07
Adversarial Training noise 5.29
class acc clean 0.72
class acc adv target 0.344
class acc adv true 0.2
d1 176.43
d2 543.62
Binarization noise 18.43
CW class acc clean 0.72
class acc adv target 0.122
class acc adv true 0.144
d1 135.29
d2 504.54
Mean Filtering noise 12.95
class acc clean 0.72
class acc adv traget 0.078
class acc adv tru 0.389
Table 5.3: Results for CIFAR-10, Autoencoder
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ATTACK DEFENSE METRIC
d1 702.87
d2 447.94
Binarization noise 25.17
FGSM class acc clean 0.72
class acc adv target 0.178
class acc adv true 0.044
d1 128.6
d2 252.76
Mean Filtering noise 11.956
class acc clean 0.72
class acc adv target 0.11
class acc adv true 0.244
d1 138.87
d2 197.27
Adversarial Training noise 7.4
class acc clean 0.72
class acc adv target 0.533
class acc adv true 0.133
d1 288.18
d2 434.97
Binarization noise 18.57
CW class acc clean 0.72
class acc adv target 0.2
class acc adv true 0.189
d1 133.74
d2 467.24
Mean Filtering noise 11.54
class acc clean 0.72
class acc adv traget 0.055
class acc adv tru 0.267
Table 5.4: Results for CIFAR-10, VAE
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5.5 DISCUSSION
We implemented L-BFGS, FGSM and Carlini Wagner iterative L2 attack on Autoencoder
and VAE models trained on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. L-BFGS attack proved to
be the strongest attack on MNIST, however due to its computational inefficiency, it is not
feasible for attacking more complex datasets like CIFAR-10. FGSM was not very effective
in targeted attack, however it did perturb the reconstructions such that they did not resem-
ble the original images for MNIST. Carlini-Wagner L2 iterative attack was effective against
MNIST autoencoder and VAE, and CIFAR-10 VAE. Also, VAE was in general easier to
attack than autoencoders, probably because the VAE was trained for very few epochs. Of
the defenses, Mean filtering was the most effective out of the three defenses discussed. It was
an interesting result, since it is such a simple pre-processing step, yet it makes the models
drastically robust to the attacks, while intensive methods like Adversarial training provided
little or no benefit.
All the attack and defense methods were built in cleverhans. The code is publicly available
on github and we hope it would be of help to other researchers interested in exploring this
space further.
5.6 FUTURE WORK
We implemented two simple attacks in this work on Autoencoders and VAEs. The recon-
structions by VAE were quite blurry even for the clean images, so we need to analyze these
attacks on a more sophisticated model like VAE-GAN, which produces sharper reconstruc-
tions. The defense methods studied here were rather simple, involving adversarial training
or image pre-processing. It would be worthwhile to explore more advanced defense methods,
like defensive distillation or JPEG compression as a pre-processing step. Further, if the ad-
versary is aware of the defense mechanism being used, they may be able to generate better
attacks than they can without that knowledge. For instance, for image pre-processing de-
fense, the adversary would generate attacks by backpropagating through the entire network
including the pre-processing layer. We expect such an attack to be effective against the mean
filtering defense, however it might be tough to backpropagate in the case of a binary thresh-
old filter, since the adversary would need to solve a discrete optimization problem. Another
important defense method which we did not explore was adversary detection. One can look
at the latent embedding of the original image, and compare it with the latent embedding of
its reconstruction. We expect that for a clean image, these two embeddings would be more
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similar, than for an adversarial image. We tested this on FGSM attack, and although it was
true when the encoder of the Autoencoder was used to get the latent embeddings, on using
a different encoder, it did not hold true. Thus, if the receiver does not have access to the
same encoder as the sender, they will not be able to detect adversarial examples using this
approach. It would be worthwhile to test some adversarial detection techniques which have
been proven to work for classification models.
link to github repository1
1https://github.com/iirishikaii/cleverhans
49
REFERENCES
[1] I. Goodfellow, J. Pouget-Abadie, M. Mirza, B. Xu, D. Warde-Farley, S. Ozair,
A. Courville, and Y. Bengio, “Generative adversarial nets,” in Advances in neural in-
formation processing systems, 2014, pp. 2672–2680.
[2] A. B. L. Larsen, S. K. Sønderby, H. Larochelle, and O. Winther, “Autoencoding beyond
pixels using a learned similarity metric,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1512.09300, 2015.
[3] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy, “Explaining and harnessing adversarial
examples,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572, 2014.
[4] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, X. Wu, S. Jha, and A. Swami, “Distillation as a defense to
adversarial perturbations against deep neural networks,” in 2016 IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy (SP). IEEE, 2016, pp. 582–597.
[5] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan, I. Goodfellow, and R. Fergus,
“Intriguing properties of neural networks,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199, 2013.
[6] J. Lu, T. Issaranon, and D. Forsyth, “Safetynet: Detecting and rejecting adversarial
examples robustly,” in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer
Vision, 2017, pp. 446–454.
[7] Y. Song, T. Kim, S. Nowozin, S. Ermon, and N. Kushman, “Pixeldefend: Leverag-
ing generative models to understand and defend against adversarial examples,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1710.10766, 2017.
[8] J. Kos, I. Fischer, and D. Song, “Adversarial examples for generative models,” in 2018
IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW). IEEE, 2018, pp. 36–42.
[9] P. Tabacof, J. Tavares, and E. Valle, “Adversarial images for variational autoencoders,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1612.00155, 2016.
[10] A. Krizhevsky and G. Hinton, “Learning multiple layers of features from tiny images,”
Citeseer, Tech. Rep., 2009.
[11] N. Papernot, F. Faghri, N. Carlini, I. Goodfellow, R. Feinman, A. Kurakin, C. Xie,
Y. Sharma, T. Brown, A. Roy, A. Matyasko, V. Behzadan, K. Hambardzumyan,
Z. Zhang, Y.-L. Juang, Z. Li, R. Sheatsley, A. Garg, J. Uesato, W. Gierke, Y. Dong,
D. Berthelot, P. Hendricks, J. Rauber, and R. Long, “Technical report on the cleverhans
v2.1.0 adversarial examples library,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.00768, 2018.
50
